The government of Pakistan has been involved in the transfer of irrigation management to farmers' organizations at different levels of irrigation networks. Khal Panchayats or water users' associations are mandated to mediate water distribution conflicts, maintain watercourses, report on tampering of outlets and shortage of water supply in the outlet to minor or distributary-level farmer organizations, collect water charges, and provide timely information about rotational running of channels to the farmers. As such, irrigators on watercourses with Khal Panchayats can potentially perform better than those without such institutions. This study explores whether or not the presence of Khal Panchayats on a watercourse and farmer organizations on the canal improves farmers' productivity and the returns to land as was envisioned during the Irrigation Management Transfer. The study utilizes the Pakistan Rural Household Panel Survey (Round 1.5) that has detailed plot level information with highly disaggregated data on irrigation type, methods, and institutions. We used the Hausman-Taylor model to regress the value of output per acre on agricultural inputs, soil and water conservation practices, plot characteristics, household demographics, and the presence of institutions such as Khal Panchayats and farmer organizations. We find that households whose plots are located on watercourses with Khal Panchayats are likely to earn 27 percent more value per acre as compared to farmers on watercourses without such institutions. The effect of the presence of Khal Panchayats is more pronounced in Kharif (the main rainy season) than in the Rabi season. Khal Panchayats lead to improved water management mainly through reducing water theft and conflicts around water, as well as improving maintenance of the watercourse and timing of water arrival. This suggests that while the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) progress has been slow in Punjab province, largely due to resistance to change by the vested interests embedded in the Punjab Irrigation Department, even the limited implementation of the IMT has already yielded substantial benefits. The presence of farmers' organization (FO) on the minor or distributary as well as the interaction of the presence of a KP and an FO, are statistically insignificant, though they have the the expected positive signs.
I. Introduction
The Indus Basin in Pakistan has one of the largest and most complex irrigation networks in the world. The network irrigates almost 34.5 million acres and consists of 44 canal systems. The length of the canals is over 56000 km while the length of the nearly 107,000 watercourses is above 1.6 million kilometers. Water is diverted to the main canals through a series of barrages and 12 inter-link river canals. These canals in turn deliver water to branch canals, distributaries, minors and eventually watercourses.
The initial pieces of legislation governing the irrigation network in the Indus Basin were passed during the colonial era by the British. According to the Canal and Drainage Act (1873) governing the irrigation network in Punjab and KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) and the Sindh Irrigation Act (1879), the construction and major repairs of watercourses are the responsibility of the provincial authorities, while overall maintenance of the watercourses is unregulated by these acts and are in effect the responsibility of the users (Muhammad, 1998) .
For more than a century, farmers and irrigation officials have relied on traditional form of farmers' organizations called "khal committees" to mobilize labor during maintenance of watercourses. However, there has been increasing awareness, particularly after the on-farm watercourse maintenance (OFWM) pilot project ) that these informal "water users associations" did not prove effective in motivating farmers to continue providing the labor needed to maintain the watercourses after improvement (Byrnes, 1992) . Studies of the OFWM pilot project experience led to the conclusion that the farmers on a watercourse would only begin to take responsibility for maintaining their watercourse after improvement if they were organized into a formal, legally-recognized Water Users' Association (WUA) that was empowered to enforce watercourse maintenance (Byrnes, 1992) . Consequently, in 1981, three Pakistani provinces (Punjab, NWFP 1 , and Baluchistan) each promulgated its own WUA Ordinance while the Sindh WUA Ordinance was promulgated in 1982 (Byrnes, 1992; Muhammad, 1998) . More than 50 percent of water users can come together and apply to the Field Officer of the OFWM for registration of their association (Muhammad, 1998) .
According to these Ordinances, WUAs are empowered, to improve, rehabilitate, operate, and maintain watercourses; establish water delivery schedules and supervise water allocation and distribution; ensure all members get their share of water in a timely manner; removing obstructions on courses; employing labor for maintenance activities; and ensuring that all members contribute. All of these authorities, however, can be curtailed by the provincial authorities (Byrnes, 1992; Muhammad, 1998) . In Sindh and KPK, half of the watercourse associations can come together to form a distributary association and half of the distributary associations can come together to form a canal association. Muhammad (1998) argues that the WUA Ordinances makes for weak user associations, because it gives little authority to the association for dispute resolution or for penalizing users who are conducting unlawful activities on the watercourses.
In 1997, irrigation and drainage authorities were formed for all the provinces. The irrigation and drainage authorities are meant to be autonomous bodies eventually taking over from the irrigation departments. The responsibility of the irrigation and drainage authority is to supply water from the barrages to the canals. Area Water Boards need be formed at each canal and Farmer Organizations have to be formed for every distributary.
The responsibility of the provincial irrigation and drainage authority is to collect dues from the Area Water Boards which in turn are responsible for collection from the Farmer , 2002) . This ordinance retains the irrigation and drainage authority and establishes similar roles and responsibility for water users' associations at all tiers. A significant change is that two-thirds of water users on a watercourse need to apply for registration for an association, instead of only the 51% requirement which was established in the previous ordinance.
Despite the above legislations, the transfer of water management to WUAs has not taken place as envisaged and much of the irrigation network continues to be governed by primarily
British era legislation, except on the canals where Area Water Boards exist, mainly due to opposition from powerful political stakeholders and a prevailing belief that water users cannot be trusted to manage their water (Ul Hassan, 2009 ).
In addition, there are not enough scientific studies that rigorously analyze the existing WUAs to shed light on whether such transfer of irrigation management in Pakistan has resulted in the expected benefits of improved watercourse maintenance, reduced water conflicts, reduced water theft, improved water rotation and timely delivery, and the resulting benefits of increased agricultural productivity. Evidence in the literature from other parts of the world suggests that WUA have led to yield improvements (Liu et al., 2002; Samad and Vermillion, 1999) , efficient utilization of water and increased production in a dry year (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000) , mobilizing labor and monetary resources for maintenance work (Zaman et al., 1998) , and conflict resolution (Waheed, 1998; Zaman et al., 1998) . There is also evidence that these benefits are space and context specific as the success of WUAs depends on factors such as democratic election of WUA leaders (Liu et al., 2002) , existing social networks such as caste or biradari ties (Waheed, 1998) , whether the watercourses are improved or traditional (Alam et al., 2012) , the presence of sub-groups within the WUA (Zhang et al., 2013) , and how active the farmer organization is (Gedara et al., 2012) .
This study explores whether or not the presence of formal Khal Panchayats on a watercourse and farmer organizations on the canal lead to improved water management which in turn would translate into improved returns to land in Punjab province of Pakistan.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study is a subset of the Pakistan Rural Household Panel Survey Among the sampled farmers in Punjab that produce either rice, wheat, cotton, or sugarcane using surface water, about 39 percent reported that there is a Khal Panchayat (KP) on the watercourse that serves their plots (Table I ). In addition, about 21 percent of the sampled households reported that there is a farmer organization (FO) that reports to the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority on the distributary that feeds the watercourse. Whenever they exist, the three main roles of Khal Panchayats are maintenance of watercourses, influencing timing of water release, and collection of abiana 2 (Table II) . Khal Panchayats are also involved in dispute settlement and maintenance of the canal.
Among households with a KP on their watercourse, two third of them responded that the KP has improved water management. As shown in Table III , KPs lead to improved water management mainly through reducing water theft and conflicts around water as well as through improved maintenance and timing of water arrival. However, a third of the households with KPs along their watercourses, responded that the presence of a KP has 2. Water charges or fees per acre. Respondents can give up to three ways in which management has improved with KP. The percentage is among those who reported that KPs improved water management on the watercourse.
The disapproval rate in terms of being unable to improve water management is worse for
Farmer Organizations (FOs) as compared to the 33 percent disapproval rate for KPs. More than half of the farmers who confirmed the presence of an FO on their canal, responded that the FO has not led to improved water management on the canal. Some of the reasons provided for such failure include, in order of importance, being an FO that does nothing at all, political pressure, unable to serve equally, having little water in the canal, and conflict within the organization.
Soil erosion, waterlogging, and salinity have been reported as prevalent by only eleven, six, and four percent of the respondents (Table I) . Unlike other provinces such as Sindh, where waterlogging and salinity has been reported to be a severe problem (Mekonnen et al., 2013) , the soil health in Punjab appears to be relatively good. Flooding is the main type of irrigating the plots with other type of irrigation such as use of furrows or bed and furrows accounting for only less than 10 percent (Table I) . Table IV The definitions of variables included in the estimation are provided in Table V .
III. Methodology
The Hausman and Taylor instrumental variables estimation of the random effects model is used in this study as it provides two main advantages over the basic fixed effects and random effects models. The random effects model is based on the assumption that the unobserved individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables (Greene, 2008) and will produce inconsistent estimators of all parameters if such correlation exists (Wooldridge, 2002) . This is a concern for the model used in this study since the unobserved individual effects is likely to be correlated with the level and type of agricultural input use decisions and practices of soil and water conservation measures.
On the other hand, fixed effects estimator produces consistent estimators without assuming away the potential correlation between the included explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity but in the process of eliminating the individual effects through first differencing or mean differencing, it also removes any time invariant explanatory variables. Thus, in fixed effects estimation, the effect of time invariant explanatory variables will simply be absorbed into the fixed effects (Greene, 2008) , making the effects of the two sets of variables indistinguishable. This is a concern when the main interest of variable is time invariant in the panel. As such, the presence of Khal Panchayts and farmer organizations, our main variables of interest, are invariant in the two seasons we have data for the sample.
The Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator, unlike the random effects estimator, allows some of the included explanatory variables to be endogenous, and, unlike the fixed effects estimator, it allows for the identification of time invariant included explanatory variables from unobserved individual effects. The Hausman-Taylor estimator is presented as follows.
(1)
where X 1it is K 1 variables that are time-varying and uncorrelated with µ i ; Z 1it is L 1 variables that are time invariant and uncorrelated with µ i ; X 2it is K 2 variables that are time-varying and correlated with µ i ; Z 2it is L 2 variables that are time invariant and correlated with µ i ; µ i is the unobserved, panel-level random effect that is assumed to have zero mean and finite variance σ 2 µ and to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) over the panels ; it is the idiosyncratic error that is assumed to have zero mean and finite variance σ 2 and to be i.i.d. over all the observations in the data; β 1 ; β 2 ; δ 1 ; and δ 2 are the corresponding K 1 × 1, K 2 × 1, Z 1 × 1, and Z 2 × 1, coefficient vectors to be estimated; and i = 1, · · ·, n, where n is the number of individuals in the sample and, for each time period
Given the endogeneity of X 2it and Z 2it , Hausman and Taylor proposed instrumental variable estimator that uses only the information within the model. Taking deviations from the mean results in
to consistently estimate β 1 and β 2 by least squares, which are the usual fixed effects estimators.
Hausman and Taylor show that the group mean deviations can be used as (
instrumental variables for estimation of β 1 , β 2 , δ 1 , and δ 2 . Because Z 1 is uncorrelated with the disturbances, it serve as a set of L 1 instrumental variables. That leaves a need for additional L 2 instrumental variables. Hausman and Taylor show that the group means for X 1 can serve as these remaining instruments and the model will be identified as long as K 1 is greater than or equal to L 2 .
In our estimating model, we use a translog specification as a flexible functional form with the levels, interactions, and squared terms of the explanatory variables. The translog specification is a second order polynomial approximation of an arbitrary production function.
To reduce the collinearity problem associated with such specifications, all the variables have been standardized by their respective means before taking their logarithmic transformation.
The dependent variable y it is the value of production per acre of wheat, rice, cotton, and values, making log transformation difficult, we followed Battese (1997) in replacing a value of one in place of the zeros before the log transformation and add a dummy variable in the estimation that gets a value of 1 if such substitution occurs and zero otherwise.
In the Kharif season, the sample is skewed towards cotton, which has high value of output per acre and yet uses less of some inputs such as tractor hours and seed as compared to rice and sugarcane. Likewise, some of the inputs are relevant to only some of the crops. For instance threshers are mainly used for wheat and the seed (or seedling) amount for sugarcane is higher than the seed amount of other crops. To capture such crop level differences, we have included crop dummy variables as well as the interaction of these crop dummies with the individual inputs. The crop dummies and their interactions with inputs are allowed to be potentially endogenous since crop choices are under the control of the farmer and hence are likely to be correlated with the unobserved individual heterogeneity.
The time invariant endogenous variable (Z 2it ) in the estimating model is an education variable that shows whether a household head ever attended school.
IV. Results and Discussion
The econometric results show that farmers operating on a watercourse where a Khal
Panchayat exists are more productive than those on a watercourse without such an institution.
As shown in Table VI implying that the returns to KP and FOs (that comes from timely watercourse maintenance or warabandi or reduced conflict) is higher in the Khariff season. Second, the main crops in the Khariff season are water intensive crops such as rice, cotton, and sugarcane, while the main Rabi crop is wheat, with the implication that the returns to orderly water distribution (both in volume, timing, incidence of conflicts, and maintenance) will be higher in Khariff.
Third, because we have excluded plots that solely use ground water, both the amount of canal water and ground water are higher in Khariff than in Rabi in our final sample. As a result, the relative importance of irrigation water sources is in favor of surface water in both the Kharif and Rabi seasons, making the return to participation in KPs and FOs higher in the Kharif season.
As may be expected, surface water is more important in determining value of output per acre in the Kharif season while ground water is more important in that regard in the Rabi season.
Table VI shows evidence that households with plots at the tail end of the watercourse are negatively affected as they turn out to have lower level of output per acre.
Though it has the expected negative sign, the waterlogging and salinity variable is not estimated with precision mainly because of lack of variability in the data set since only less than six and four percent of the observations in the estimating model reported to have salinity and waterlogging problems on their plots.
Production in the province appears to be inhibited by shortage of labor. Increasing both hired and family labor are likely to increase value of output per acre (Table VI) . The return on family labor is higher on seeding and pesticide application and has higher return during the Rabi season. In addition, there appears to be a relationship of substitutability between family labor and hired labor.
Increasing pesticide applications also lead to increased returns and the gains from pesticide applications are higher during the Rabi season where wheat is the main crop produced.
V. Conclusion
Parts 
